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This paper examines the effect of audit committee attributes on auditor brand 
name proxy by the Big 4. The study utilizes 88 listed firms in Nigeria through 
440 firm-year observations ranging between the years 2012 to 2016. The data for 
the study were extracted from the firms’ annual reports and Thompson Reuters 
Data Stream. A panel logistic regression was employed to estimate the model of 
the study. Consistent with complementary hypothesis the findings demonstrate 
that audit committee attributes (audit committee independence, audit committee 
financial accounting experts, audit committee legal expert, female audit committee 
member and audit committee stock ownership) are positively related to auditor 
brand name. The findings also support the substitution hypothesis perspectives 
by revealing an inverse relationship between audit committee meetings, audit 
committee tenure, audit committee chair and auditor brand name. Our findings 
offer an initial insight on the effect of audit committee legal expert, and audit 
committee stock ownership on auditor brand name. Thus, the findings can 
benefit existing and prospective shareholders who are the direct users of financial 
reports. This study can also help policy-makers and regulators by allowing them 
to better recognize the importance of these distinctive audit committee attributes 
in enhancing the quality of audits, which is one of the most vital elements of 
improving financial reporting quality.
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Introduction
Auditing is a systematized and autonomous examination of accounts 
of an organization to ascertain the truth and fairness of the financial 
reports.  Thus, auditing is expected to play a monitoring role by 
minimizing agency costs between management and corporates’ 
stakeholders. Invariably auditors are assumed to act in investors’ 
interests and aid financial statement users by confirming the reliability 
of financial reporting. This is because high-quality information is 
likely to lessen asymmetric information problems between the firm 
and its investors, and accordingly, cut the agency costs (Bushman & 
Smith, 2001).
Consequently, it is argued that an active audit committee demands 
for a higher external audit effort to protect firms’ reputation, endorse 
shareholders’ interest and reinforce the integrity of financial reporting 
(Carcello, Hermanson, Neal & Riley, 2002;  Huang, 2006). The 
foregoing argument supports the complementary hypothesis of audit 
which presumes that external auditors play a pivotal role in corporate 
governance which functions as a complementary instrument for 
improving the legal protection of outside stakeholders (Huang, 2006; 
Choi & Wang,  2003). As a result, this reduces agency complicit between 
firm’s insiders and external stakeholders. This is because the external 
stakeholders  rely heavily on external auditors’ monitoring efforts 
(Ball, Kothari, Robin, & Pope, 2000). The substitution hypothesis 
proposes that for some firms to have a high quality external auditing 
to serve as a substitute for legal protection, and to lessen agency 
conflicts between firms’ internal and external stakeholders in a weak 
legal environment (Choi & Wang ,2003). Hence, such firms in a weak 
legal environment will have a higher demand for better audits than 
companies in strong legal environment (Gomes, 2000; Klapper & 
Love, 2004). In contrast, an inverse association between governance 
mechanisms and audit quality might be expected if good governance 
can substitute for external auditing, leading to a decline in audit 
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fees (Hay, Knechel, & Wong, 2006). From the above argument, it is 
expected that an effective audit committee will demand for greater 
level of assurance. This is likely by engaging Big 4 auditors to provide 
higher quality of auditing services which in turn improve the financial 
reporting quality.
Therefore, despite the foregoing arguments, the regulatory 
authorities and investors frequently interrogate the job of both audit 
committee and external auditors since the audited financial reports 
have been exposed to be fraudulent in many of the contemporary 
financial scandals such as Enron and WorldCom. Consequently, since 
the audit committee selects the external auditor while the external 
auditor reports to the audit committee, there is a likelihood that both 
the two monitoring devices may operate jointly to limit accounting 
manipulation and enhance financial reporting quality (Alves, 2013). 
In light of the foregoing, this study is set to examine the influence 
of audit committee attributes in the selection of auditor brand name 
of listed companies in Nigeria. Thus the study is inspired by the 
recent instantaneous increase and dominance of Big 4 auditors in 
the Nigerian audit market, which directly affects the fees that is paid 
to the external auditors by their clients. Consequently, Nairametrics 
(2017) gathered that  the Big 4 auditors earned about 6.4 billion Naira 
(equivalent to 20.3 million USD) in the auditing services of the 28 
largest firms in Nigeria in 2016. However, the question of whether 
Big 4 auditors offer higher financial reporting quality than the non-
Big 4 auditors has continued to be a debatable issue (Jiang, Wang, & 
Wang, 2018).
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Audit committee plays a vital role in corporate governance practices 
by overseeing the quality of audits. Thus, an active audit committee 
that has pertinent expertise and which is independent of management, 
is presumed to enhance approaches to audits  which enriches audit 
quality and in return increases financial reporting quality (Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2002; DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Sulaiman, 
2017).  For that, better auditing is vital for the steadfastness of the 
financial reports since it is assumed to safeguard the interest of the 
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investors and other stakeholders (Sulaiman, 2017). Prior studies 
on audit quality have argued that audit firm size denoted by Big 4 
auditors is a strong surrogate for audit quality since larger auditors 
are expected to have strong enthusiasms and are more proficient 
to provide high quality audits (DeAngelo, 1981; DeFond & Zhang, 
2014). Studies that have been conducted on the connection between 
audit committee and audit firm size support the complementary 
relationship between audit committee attributes and audit firm size 
(Akhalumeh, Agweda, & Ogunkuade, 2017; Ejeagbasi, Nweze, Ezeh, 
& Nze, 2015; Jiraporn, Chintrakarn, Tong, & Treepongkaruna, 2018). 
This suggests that an active audit committee purchases a high quality 
audit in their demand for greater assurance. The above findings 
have been validated by the research conducted by  Zhang, Zhou 
and  Zhou (2007) who explore the influence of audit committee and 
audit independence. They demonstrate that effective audit committee 
enhances audit quality by engaging the Big 4 auditors.
Agency Theory
The agency theory posits that monitoring devices align the interests 
of the management with the interests of owners in order to lessen 
the conflict of interest as well as any likely managers’ opportunistic 
behaviours that could arise (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Consequently, 
the management might be more focused in their own interests over 
the stockholders’ interests of wealth maximizing which increases 
agency cost. Yet, agency cost arises because of the dissimilarities 
between ownership and the control from management leading to 
information asymmetry between the managers and the stockholders. 
Therefore, it has been affirmed that  agency cost intensifies the 
demand for monitoring devices that will provide assurance of the 
managers’ performance in harmony with the contract (Huang, 2006). 
Several governance mechanisms can be applied in aligning the 
interests of the stockholders and managers. These comprise internal 
mechanisms such as boards of directors, audit committee, and 
external mechanisms like the external auditors (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Therefore, a seamless combination of mechanisms which are being 
used, can be considered as a composite where the effectiveness of 
one device depends on the effectiveness of the other (Davis & Useem, 
2002). As such, it is expected when the audit committee engages better 
auditors, that can curtail the opportunistic reporting by manager and 
thus enhance financial reporting quality (Defond & Jiambalvo, 1991). 
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Institutional Theory
Institutional theory supports how governance devices achieve 
formal roles that help to legitimise the communication amid the 
key players within the corporate governance.  With reference to the 
institutional theory, the audit committee members will act to affirm 
to other institutions and that audit committees over time, will tend 
to become like the others within the similar industry. The audit 
committee members may have had similiar experiences as well as the 
management. Thus the audit committees and the boards will fulfill 
an imperative signaling role to those outside the institution such 
as existing or potential shareholders by deliberating perceptions 
of reliance and proficiency in the workings of the audit committee 
(Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2008).  The institutional theory 
also has an unspecified prediction on whether the audit committee 
will be friends with managers or the auditor in disagreements that the 
auditors may have with managers. For instance, the audit committees 
habitually fulfill a key figurative role that in practice might lead the 
members to legitimize their roles by querying the management.
Audit Committee Size and Auditors Brand Name 
It has been argued that larger audit committee has a high likelihood 
of enriching its status and power in a firm, thus demanding a high 
quality audit (Kalbers & Fogarty, 1993). This has been confirmed 
by Akhalumeh et al. (2017) who studied the effect of corporate 
governance on audit quality in Nigeria. They find that the larger 
board is significantly and positively related to Big 4 auditors. This 
indicates that larger board requests for better audit assurance by 
purchasing the service of Big 4 auditors. In addition, Ejeagbasi et 
al. (2015) studied the effect of corporate governance and audit 
quality in Nigeria. They showed that larger board size is positively 
and significantly related to Big 4 auditors. They contend that larger 
boards demand for better audit assurance by employing Big 4 
auditors.  The result has validated the finding of Chen and Zhou 
(2007) who examined the influence of audit committee and board 
attributes on auditor change decisions by Andersen’s clients. They 
showed that larger audit committee is more likely to engage the Big 
4 auditors in the selection of successor auditors.  In line with the 
foregoing, the study hypothesized that: 
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H1 Audit committee size has a positive significant relationship with Big 4 
auditors.
Audit Committee Independence and Auditors Brand Name
It has been argued that audit committee that is independent of 
management does not have a private or economic dependence on 
managers. Consequently, agency theory suggests that an independent 
audit committee may be more prepared to disagree with management 
on diverse issues (Abbott, Parker, Peters & Raghunandan, 2003; 
Carcello & Neal, 2003). Thus, throughout the evaluation of the audit 
program and results thereof, an independent audit committee may 
demand for a comprehensive audit scope in order to escape being 
connected to a financial misstatement and preserve reputational 
capital (Abbott et al., 2003; Carcello & Neal, 2003). The foregoing 
argument have been confirmed by a recent study of Jiraporn, 
Chintrakarn, Tong and Treepongkaruna (2018) who examined 
whether board independence can be substituted with external audit 
quality. They employed a sample of 14,000 firm-year observations for 
18 years. They demonstrated that firms that have larger percentage of 
independent directors on the board have less chance of employing Big 
4 auditors. This suggested that robust board with greater proportion 
of independence directors gain more active governance and thus 
do not require as much from external auditors. More so, Ejeagbasi 
et al. (2015) found that audit committee independence is positively 
and significantly linked to Big 4 auditors.  This has been confirmed 
by Akhalumeh et al. (2017) who revealed that board independence is 
positively and significantly associated to Big 4 auditors. This indicates 
that larger percentage of independent directors in the audit committee 
demand for higher audit assurance by employing Big 4 auditors.  In 
line with the foregoing arguments it is hypothesized that:
H2 Audit committee independence has a positive significant relationship with 
Big 4 auditors.
Audit Committee Meetings and Auditors Brand Name
It has been argued that audit committee that meets at least twice 
biannually has more likelihood of  engaging an industry specialist 
auditor (Abbott et al., 2003). Prior literature has shown that audit 
committee’s frequent meeting is positively associated to audit quality 
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(Lee & Mande, 2005). The above arguments have been empirically 
confirmed by Chen and Zhou (2007) who showed that audit committee 
that meets frequently has a high likelihood of engaging Big 4 auditors 
in the selection of successor auditors. This is consistent with the 
notion that the audit committee that meets frequently are more likely 
to purchase high audit quality in their quest for greater assurance. In 
contrast, Sharma et al. (2009) found an inverse relationship between 
audit committee meetings and Big 4 auditors. Their finding supports 
the substitutional hypothesis of audit quality, which suggests that 
effective governance devices can serve as substitutes to external 
monitoring provided by external auditors. In line with the above 
argument the study hypothesized that:
H3 Audit committee meeting has a positive significant relationship with Big 
4 auditors.
Audit Committee Expertise and Auditors Brand Name
The proponents of institutional theory have argued that a company’s 
audit committee whose members have specific industry skill is linked 
to higher financial reporting quality. Accordingly, if managers and 
audit committee of such company work on the same board within 
the similar industry, this association may expand the committee’s 
expertise and subsequently improve its general skill to act as effective 
monitors (Cohen et al., 2014). This has been confirmed by Kim, 
Kwak, Lim and Yu (2017) who demonstrated that audit committee 
financial accounting experts enhances audit quality. This suggests 
that increasing the proportion of financial accounting experts in audit 
committee brings about an additional increase in effort in order to 
enhance external monitoring. This has validated the finding of Chen 
and Zhou (2007) who revealed that proportion of financial expertise 
in audit committee increases the chance of selecting Big 4 auditors. In 
another development, it has been argued that legal experts serve as 
monitors rather than mere signal to financial reporting quality. This 
is because, Baxter and Cotter (2009) have affirmed that legal expertise 
on the company’s audit committee significantly reduce the practice 
of earnings management and thus enhance audit quality. Therefore, 
their legal knowledge allows them to be more familiar with litigation 
threats relating to financial reporting issues.H4 Audit committee financial 
accounting expert has a positive significant relationship with Big 4 auditors.
H5 Audit committee legal expert has a positive significant relationship with 
Big 4 auditors.
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Female Audit Committee Member and Auditors Brand Name
It has been contended that female directors in the boards are more 
ready for board meetings than the male counterparts.  Thus,  high 
proportion of female directors may improve board actions and 
effectiveness (Huse & Solberg, 2006). Prior literature has showed that 
female audit committee members demand better audit efforts than 
their male colleagues. This has been empirically affirmed by Lai, 
Srinidhi and Tsui (2017) who showed that female directors in audit 
committee demand greater audit quality than the male directors in 
US firms. This is not surprising since liberal feminist theory suggests 
that if females would be given equal chances, males and females will 
develop their potential judiciously and more equally. Consequently, 
their psychological distinctions will decrease and later fade (Fischer 
et al.,1993). This has been confirmed by Aldamen et al. (2016)  who 
suggest  that a divergent gender in audit committee demands a higher 
quality audit in a high risk environment.
H6 Female audit committee member has a positive significant relationship 
with Big 4 auditors.
Audit Committee Stock Ownership and Auditors Brand Name
The advocates of agency theory have argued that independent 
external auditors are demanded due to a desire to reduce agency 
cost arising from asymmetric information between stockholders and 
managers. This has been empirically confirmed by previous studies 
(DeFond, 1992; Menon & Williams, 1994). Prior literature on audit 
committee stock ownership has contended that larger percentage 
of shares possessed by audit committee significantly decreases 
the chance that the auditor provides a going concern report for 
economically troubled companies and auditor dismissal (Bronson, 
Carcello, Hollingsworth & Neal, 2009; Hamdan, Mushtaha & Al-
Sartawi, 2013; Vafeas, 2005). In addition, Ejeagbasi et al. (2015) found 
that ownership concentration has a positive relationship with the Big 
4 auditors. Furthermore Adam and Bala (2015) examined ownership 
structure and audit quality in Nigeria. Their study indicated that 
director’s ownership has a positive significant association with 
audit quality of listed banks in Nigeria. They suggest that a higher 
percentage of directors’ ownership enhance their monitoring role by 
providing greater audit assurance through engaging better auditors. 
In addition, with the foregoing, the study hypothesized that:H7 Audit 
committee stock ownership has a positive significant relationship with Big 
4 auditors.
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Audit Committee Tenure and Auditors Brand Name
The proponents of agency theory have argued that the longer it 
takes for a director to serve on the board, the more informed he 
will be about the entity’s practices and hence become more active in 
preventing the incidence of financial reporting fraud (Beasley, 1996; 
Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Vafeas 2005). This suggests that audit 
committee tenure has positive influence on audit quality. Moreover, 
it has been contended that the positive association of long serving 
directors on monitoring effectiveness compensates the negative 
association predominantly when it comes to overseeing financial 
reporting process.Thus resulting in long serving board members 
who are independent to managers could have greater governance 
quality since they might be more watchful with reputational capitals 
and thus acquire more audit efforts (Chan, Liu & Sun, 2013; Vafeas, 
2003).  This suggests the external audit might complement to audit 
committee governance and as a result, there might be a positive 
relationship between the percentage of long serving directors on 
the audit committee and audit fees. Thus, external auditors might 
price audit committee’s effectiveness, for instance, audit committee’s 
governance may substitute with external auditing. In addition,  it 
has been contended that external auditors can devote fewer efforts 
on clients with a high percentage of long serving directors on the 
independent audit committee in circumstances where long tenure 
directors have superior monitoring effectiveness (Chan, Liu & Sun, 
2013). This suggests that long tenure directors might have a lesser 
request for audit efforts. From the above argument, it is expected 
that long tenure directors may request fewer audit efforts. In the 
light of the foregoing arguments, the study hypothesized that:
H8 Audit committee tenure has a positive significant relationship with Big 
4 auditors.
Audit Committee Chair and Auditors Brand Name 
Previous studies on audit committee chair have established that 
audit committee chair gains control over audit committee, as they 
plan for the agendas and control the information flow (Sharma 
et al., 2009). This has been empirically confirmed by Bruynseels 
and Cardinaels (2014) who explored whether audit committee is 
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a manager’s watchdog or a personal colleague of the CEOs. They 
utilized a sample of listed firms for five years from 2004 to 2008. 
They revealed that audit committees who have social network to the 
CEO purchase less audit services and participate more in earnings 
management. They also suggested that the external auditors of 
such companies whose audit committee have social network with 
managers are less likely to provide going-concern opinions or to 
disclose internal control weakness. This has been confirmed by a 
recent study by Qu (2018) who showed that audit committee chair 
vary from ordinary members of the committee as they are commonly 
in charge of more official responsibilities including schedule for the 
committees’ meetings, setting the agenda, and collaborating with 
the internal and external auditors. In line with the above arguments 
the study hypothesized that:
H9 Audit committee chair has a positive significant relationship with Big 
4 auditors.




The population consist of 170 listed firms in the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange (NSE) as at 31st December 2016. From the total, 55 firms 
were identified as financial institutions thus; they had left out a total 
of 115 firms. Without considering the 15 firms that were delisted by 
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework. 
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NSE in 2016, there were 100 firms left. Out of these 100 firms, 12 firms 
did not provide complete information. Therefore, a final sample of 
88 firms was employed in this current study. The duration of this 
study ranged from 2012 to 2016. The data for the study were obtained 
from the annual reports of the listed firms and Thompson Reuters 
DataStream. Table 1 presents the description of how the sample was 
generated.
Table 1
Sample Computation for Firms that Meet the Filtering Process
Sample computation for year 2012 to 2016 Firms Firm-year 
observations
Total population 170 850
Less: 
Financial Services  55 275
Total Non-financial Service Firms 115 575
Less:
Firms Delisted by NSE IN 2016  15 75
Firms that did not provide complete 
information
 12 60
Final sampled firms  88 440
Source. NSE, 2016 
Variable Measurement and Model Specification 
Various measurements have been employed as proxies for individual 
audit committee attributes. Some prior literature have used dummy 
variables zero and one (Cohen, Hoitash, Krishnamoorthy & 
Wright, 2014; Dhaliwal, Naiker & Navissi, 2010; Sultana, Mitchell 
& Zahn, 2013; Zaman, Hudaib & Haniffa, 2011). Other studies have 
employed aggregate numbers of individual surrogates or ratios 
of the surrogates to the total number of audit committee members 
(Nelson & Devi, 2013; Saleh, Iskandar, & Rahmat, 2007; Sultana, 
2015). Consistent with prior studies (Abernathy et al., 2014; Xie 
et al., 2003; Klein, 2002; Krishnan et al., 2011; Yermack, 2004), this 
study employed an aggregate number of audit committee members 
in some of the committee’s characteristics and ratios for some of the 
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committees’ attributes to the aggregate numbers of the committees’ 
members. Following AlQadasi and Abidin (2018),  Bala, Amran and 
Shaari (2018), Sani, Latif & Al-Dhamari (2018) and Zhang et al. (2007), 
auditor brand name is measured as a dummy variable 1 when a firm 
is audited by Big 4 auditors and 0 when a firm is audited by a non-
Big 4 auditors.  The study used some variables as a control for the 
company’s specific characteristics and governance characteristics that 
have been employed by prior studies (Abernathy et al., 2014; Badolato 
et al., 2014; Beasley, 1996; Garba & Mohamed 2018; Krishnan et al., 
2011; Saleh et al., 2007; Sultana, 2015). To ensure precision, the control 
variables of this study included firm size (FS), leverage (LEV), firm 
age (FAGE), board financial expertise (BF), board independence (BI) 
and sales growth (SGROWTH). Following Krishnan et al. (2011) and 
Badolato et al. (2014), we controlled  two governance characteristics 
which are the board expertise and the board which have been 
affirmed to have a significant effect on monitoring effectiveness and 
endorsing financial reporting process (Carcello & Neal, 2003; Klein, 
2002). Therefore, the study expected that the board expertise has a 
positive significant influence with Big 4 auditors. Additionally, it has 
been confirmed that a larger proportion of independent directors 
on the boards increases the likelihood of audit quality (Alves, 2014; 
2005; Klein, 2002). Consistent with the above arguments, the study 
has projected a positive and significant association between board 
independence and Big 4 auditors.
Similarly, the study also controlled the firm size which was proxied 
by the natural logarithm of total assets and, leverage was proxied by 
the total debt to total equity ratio. It has been contended  that larger 
companies are linked to higher financial reporting quality as they are 
more closely supervised in the market (Bala & Kumai, 2015; Klein, 
2002). Thus, we expect a positive significant association between 
firm size and Big 4 auditors. Furthermore, prior literature showed 
that highly leveraged companies are connected with a higher level 
of asymmetric timeliness of accruals which, in return, reduces the 
quality of financial reporting process (Klein, 2002; Krishnan et al., 
2011; Sultana et al., 2013). In line with with (Bala, Amran & Shaari, 
2018) and Chen et al. (2010) we expect a positive association between 
sales growth and Big 4 auditors. Finally, consistent with Leung, 
Srinidhi and Xie (2017), we controlled for Firm age  and has presumed 
a positive  association between older firms and Big 4 auditors. The 
details of measurement of variables and their definitions are presented 
in Table 2.
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Table 2
Summary of Independent Variable Measurement
Variable Hypotheses Acronyms Measurement
Independent 
variables
AC Size H1 ACSIZ Aggregate number of audit 
committee members  
AC Independence H2 ACIDP Proportion of independent 
non-executive directors in 
audit 
AC Meetings H3 ACMET Frequency of meetings held 
by audit committee 
AC Financial 
Accounting Experts H4
ACFAEX Ration of audit committee 
members who qualified as 
professional accountants 
with certificates Association 
of National Accountants 
of Nigeria, Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of 
Nigeria or their equivalent  




ACLEX Ration of audit committee 
members with legal 
backgrounds; Bachelors of 
Laws,  Masters in Laws, 
members of Nigerian Bar 
Association to the total 
number of audit committee 
members
Female AC Member H6 FACME Proportion of  female 
directors on audit committee 
AC Stock 
Ownership
H7 ACSOW Aggregate number of  shares 
held by  audit committee 
members
AC Tenure H8 ACTNR Average tenure of audit 
committee members 
(continued)
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Variable Hypotheses Acronyms Measurement
AC Chair H9 ACCHR Dummy variable computed  
as one if the audit committee 
is chaired by a shareholder 




AUBRN Dummy variable computed 
as one if a firm is audited by 
big 4 and zero otherwise 
Control Variables
Board Expertise BFEX Proportion of board 




BID Proportion of independent 
directors on the board
Firm Size FSIZ Natural logarithm of total 
asset 
Leverage LEVR Long-term debt to total 
equity 
Firm Age FAGE Computed as year of 
observation minus year of 
listing 
Sales Growth SGROWTH Change in sales divided by 
sales in previous year 
Model Specification 
The hypotheses of the study were tested using the following logistic 
model:
AUBRN = β0 + β1ACSIZit + β2ACIDPit+ β3ACMETit + β4ACFAEXit 
+ β5ACLEXit +β6FACMEit + β7ACSOWit + β8ACTNRit β9ACCHRit + 
β10BFEXit + β11BIDit + β12FSIZit + β13LEVRit +β14FAGEit β15SGROWTHit 
+εit …………………………………..……….(1)
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Results and Discussions
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the studied variables. 
Following prior studies, we utilized  continuous variables with 
outsized observations at 5% or 95% confidence intervals to control the 
outliers in the data (Barth, Landsman, Lang & Williams, 2012; Ittonen, 
Miettinen, Vähämaa & Miettinen, 2010; Yang & Krishnan, 2005). 
Table 3 shows that the mean of audit committee size (ACSIZ) was 
five members, alternating from four o six. On average, 43% of audit 
committees had independent directors, fluctuating from 25% and 
50%. The committees met at least four times annually. On average, 
21% of audit committee members had financial accounting experts. 
While some firms did not have any members with financial accounting 
expertise, other firms had up to 50% financial accounting experts in 
the committees. A mean of 10% of audit committee members had legal 
expertise (ACLEX), with some firms having up to 29%. An average of 
54% of audit committee members had female directors while some 
firms did not have female representation.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
AUBRN 440 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00
ACSIZ 440 5.47 0.86 4.00 6.00
ACIDP 440 0.43 0.09 0.25 0.50
ACMET 440 3.79 0.62 3.00 5.00
ACFAEX 440 0.21 0.13 0.00 0.50
ACLEX 440 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.29
FACME 440 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00
ACSOW (Units) 440 37,800,000 79100000 12,768.00 300,000,000
ACTNR 440 5.11 1.44 3.00 8.00
(continued)
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ACCHR 440 0.89 0.31 0.00 1.00
BID 440 0.72 0.11 0.06 0.92
BFEX 440 0.50 0.16 0.00 0.88
FSIZ 440 16.42 1.59 13.76 19.45
LEVR 440 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.07
FAGE 440 23.82 13.29 4.00 42.00
SGROWTH 440 0.27 2.64 -5.26 7.51
Notes: AUBRN = Big 4 auditors (KPMG, Price Waterhouse Coopers, Ernst & Young 
and Deloitte). ACSIZ = AC size, ACIDP = AC independence, ACMET = AC meetings, 
ACFAEX = AC financial expertise, ACLEX = AC legal expert, FACME = female AC 
member, ACSOW = AC stock ownership, ACTNR = AC tenure, ACCHR = AC chair 
independence, BID = board independence, BFEX = board expertise, FSIZ = firm size 
LEVR = leverage, FAGE = firm age, SGROWTH = sales growth.
Audit committee stock ownership (ACSOW) extended from 12,768 
units to 300,000,000 units, with a mean of 37,800,000 units. Audit 
committee tenure (ACTNR) was on average five years, extending from 
three to eight years. While in some firms, the audit committee were 
chaired by directors, but majority were chaired by the shareholders’ 
representatives. This is one of the unique attributes of audit committee 
formation in Nigeria, because it is a requirement by the Companies 
and Allied Matters Acts of Nigeria (2004) that audit committee 
members should be composed of equal representation from both the 
shareholders and the directors.
Correlations
Table 4 depicts the correlation matrix for variables of the study. Largely, 
the results show that multicollinearity does not stance a threat to the 
estimation variables. The highest correlations among the independent 
variables were 48% and 45% between ACMET and ACSIZ as well as 
FSIZ and ACSIZ, respectively. These correlations may be considered 
normal because Hair, Black, Barry, Babin and Anderson (2014) have 
argued that a correlation of less than 90% may not be a problematical 
for estimation. On one hand, ACIDP, ACFAEX ACLEX, FACME, 
and ACSOW were positively correlated with AUBRN. The positive 
coefficients might mirror the nature of their effect in the regression 
estimates. Alternatively, ACSIZ, ACMET, ACTNR and ACCHR were 
negatively correlated with AUBRN.
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Multivariate Analysis
Relationship between of Audit Committee Attributes and Auditor 
Brand Name
This section examines the hypotheses of the study (H1- H9) to 
determine the effect of audit committee attributes and AUBRN. 
Table 5 shows the regression results of the relationship between 
audit committee attributes and AUBRN. Table 5 shows that ACSIZ 
had a positive insignificant relationship with AUBRN. This implies 
that a larger audit committee might not contribute in the selection of 
auditors’ brand name in the Nigerian listed firms. The finding was 
contrary to the study expectation (H1) which assumed that ACSIZ 
has a positive association with AUBRN. This could be a result of the 
fact that larger ACSIZ may be too difficult to manage as too large 
members may possibly result in a slower decision-making progress. 
The findings also show that ACIDP had a positive significant 
association with AUBRN at 5% significance level. This proposes that 
a larger proportion of independent directors in the audit committee 
increases the probability that a firm will engage Big 4 auditors, further 
supporting (H2), which anticipated a positive relationship between 
audit committee attributes and AUBRN.
Table 5
Panel Regression on the Relationship between Audit Committee Attributes 
and AUBRN
AUBRN Hypotheses(sign) Coef. Std. Err. z-val. p-val.
ACSIZ H1(+) -0.18 0.18 -1.00 0.32
ACIDP H2 (+) 2.57 1.27 2.02** 0.04
ACMET H3 (+) -0.76 0.24 -3.12*** 0.00
ACFAEX H4 (+) 2.53 0.92 2.75*** 0.01
ACLEX H5 (+) 2.56 1.44 1.78* 0.08
FACME H6 (+) 0.95 0.26 3.67*** 0.00
ACSOW H7 (+) 0.00 0.00 2.40** 0.02
ACTNR H8 (+) -0.25 0.08 -3.04*** 0.00
ACCHR H9 (+) -0.83 0.39 -2.10** 0.04
BID 1.97 1.11 1.77* 0.08
(continued)
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AUBRN Hypotheses(sign) Coef. Std. Err. z-val. p-val.
BFEX 2.23 0.83 2.68*** 0.01
FSIZ 0.40 0.10 4.06*** 0.00
LEVR -7.70 6.81 -1.13 0.26
FAGE 0.00 0.01 0.43 0.67
SGROWTH -0.03 0.04 -0.77 0.44
Cons -5.31 1.76 -3.02*** 0.00
 Pseudo R2 0.15
 LR chi2(15) 91.31








Prob > chi2 0.97
Notes: AUBRN = Big 4 auditors (KPMG, Price Waterhouse Coopers, Ernst & Young 
and Deloitte). ACSIZ = AC size, ACIDP = AC independence, ACMET = AC meetings, 
ACFAEX = AC financial expertise, ACLEX = AC legal expert, FACME = female AC 
member, ACSOW = AC stock ownership, ACTNR = AC tenure, ACCHR = AC chair 
independence, BID = board independence, BFEX = board expertise, FSIZ = firm size 
LEVR = leverage, FAGE = firm age, SGROWTH = sales growth, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.
This encourages the audit committee to purchase high quality 
auditing services and be more passionate to reduce the propensity 
of financial reporting frauds. The result is consistent with the agency 
theory which proposes that audit committee which is independent 
of managers might be more willing to disagree with managers about 
dissimilar issues (Abbott et al., 2003; Carcello & Neal, 2003). Thus, 
making them to be more watchful on financial reporting issues. This 
supports the findings of Beasley (1996), Hudaib and Cooke (2005) and 
Ejeagbasi et al. (2015) who found positive association between ACIDP 
and AUBRN. 
Contrary to the our expectation (H3), ACMET was found to have an 
inverse significant relationship with AUBRN. This suggests that, 
more frequency of ACMET decreases the likelihood of employing Big 
4 auditors. This finding supports the substitution hypothesis of audit 
quality which proposes an inverse association between governance 
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instruments and audit quality. A likely reason for this could be that 
audit committee which meets frequently can stimulate audit coverage 
through the various steps of the audits. Consequently, there is a high 
probability that more recurrent audit committee meetings may reduce 
the accidental issues of financial frauds in a firm and thus qualifying 
them to demand less audit efforts. This finding validates previous 
studies (Abbott et al., 2004; Raghunandan,  Read & Rama, 2001) who 
found that regular audit committee meetings reduced the extent 
of financial restatement because such meetings with the internal 
auditors will allow them to be kept informed and acquainted with 
the accounting and auditing issues. In addition, Sharma et al. (2009) 
found an inverse relationship between audit committee meetings and 
Big 4 auditors.
ACFAEX had a positive significant association with AUBRN at 1% 
significance level. The result is in line with the study expectation 
(H4), which hypothesized that ACFAEX has a positive significant 
association with AUBRN. This deduced that audit committee 
members with financial accounting knowledge are highly likely 
to purchase the services of Big 4 auditors in their quest for greater 
assurance. This result is consistent with the complementary 
hypothesis of audit that is linked to agency theory which proposes 
that auditing service is needed to minimize agency conflicts rising 
from the interest of stockholders and managers. Consequently, audit 
committee members with financial accounting knowledge are more 
willing to engage better auditors who will in turn be more effective 
monitors on managers’ actions and thus confirm that appropriate 
financial report and disclosure exist. This supports the findings of 
Abbott et al. (2003), Carcello and Neal (2003) and Kim (2015) who 
revealed that ACFAEX is significantly associated to the likelihood 
of hiring high quality auditors such as Big 4 auditors or industry 
specialist auditors. Interestingly, it is apparent that ACLEX had a 
positive significant association with AUBRN. This suggests that audit 
committee members with legal backgrounds have a probability of 
engaging Big 4 auditors. The result supports the study hypothesis 
(H5), which presumes that ACLEX has a positive relationship with 
AUBRN. This is in line with institutional theory which proposes that 
audit committee that has members with specific expertise is related 
to higher financial reporting quality (Cohen et al., 2014). This is 
not astonishing as audit committee members with legal experience 
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prepare the committee to be more cautious about legal risks that are 
connected to erroneous or poor aggressive financial reports. This 
results in the employment of the services of better auditors such as 
the Big 4 auditors in order to acquire better audit assurance. This 
supports the findings of Krishnan et al. (2011) who revealed that legal 
experts in the audit committee may assist in ensuring better financial 
reporting as financial reporting quality can be linked to legal liability 
threats and their legal experiences required them to be more vigilant 
about such threats.
Table 5 also reveals that FACME had a positive significant association 
with the AUBRN at 1% significance level. This suggests that the 
existence of at least a female director in the audit committee increases 
the likelihood of choosing the services of Big 4 auditors than the non-
Big 4 auditors in the listed firms in Nigeria. The finding is in line with 
the study expectation (H6), which assumes that FACME has a positive 
significant association with AUBRN. The result is consistent with the 
perception that a diverse gender in audit committee demands for a 
higher quality audit in high risk environments. The result is in line 
with the findings of Aldamen et al. (2016), Huang and Thiruvadi 
(2010) and Lai et al. (2017) who showed that FACME request for a 
high audit quality to obtain a better audit assurance.  ACSOW had 
a positive significant association with AUBRN at the 5% significance 
level. This infers that unit of shares controlled by audit committee 
members increases the probability of selecting Big 4 auditors other 
than non-Big 4 auditors. This is consistent with agency perspective 
which proposes that the monitoring role offers by ACSOW makes 
them to demand greater audit assurance by engaging better auditors. 
The finding support the study hypothesis (H6), which presumes that 
ACSOW has a positive significant association with AUBRN. The 
result is in line with the finding of Kibiya et al. (2016) who revealed 
that increasing the percentage of shares held by audit committee 
improves their monitoring role and enhances financial reporting 
quality.
Contrary to our expectation (H7), it is found that ACTNR had a 
negative significant association with AUBRN. This suggests that long 
serving directors are less likely to employ Big 4 auditors. Possible 
explanation for this might be that long serving directors can have 
greater knowledge, skill and potential to perform better. This makes 
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them to require less desire for greater external monitoring offered by 
Big 4 auditors. This is consistent with the substitution effect hypothesis 
which proposes an inverse association between governance devices 
and audit quality. The result also confirms the arguments of agency 
theory proponents who advocate that long tenure directors are more 
acquainted and informed about the firms practices and thus becoming 
more effective in reducing the incident of financial reporting fraud 
(Beasley, 1996; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Vafeas 2005). ACCHR 
had a negative significant association with Big 4 auditors. This 
proposes that the chairmanship of shareholders in AC decreases the 
likelihood of employing Big 4 auditors. The result is contrary to our 
prior expectation which hypothesized that ACCHR has a positive 
association with AUBRN. This result is consistent with the findings 
of  prior studies (Sharma et al., 2009) who found that audit chair gains 
control over audit committee, schedule for the agendas and controls 
the information flow. This makes them to have less desire for high 
audit efforts.
Sensitivity Analysis
To assess the sensitivity of the results and to confirm that the findings 
were not sensitive to endogeneity and the choice of alternative 
measurements of the independent variables sensitivity tests were 
conducted. The following subsections present the results of the 
sensitivity analysis used by the study.
Alternative Measurements of Independent Variables 
This section presents alternative measurements of the independent 
variables of the study. The alternative measurements are considered 
to act as sensitivity checks. Recalled that seven predictor variables 
were measured as continuous variables in the main analysis (ACSIZ, 
ACIDP, ACMET, ACFAEX, ACLEX, ACTNR, and ACSOW). 
However, we used dichotomous measures for these variables in the 
sensitivity analysis following AlQadasi and Abidin (2018), Krishnan 
et al. (2011), Xie et al. (2003) and Zhang et al. (2007). Table 6 shows 
the results of alternative measurement of independent variables for 
the sensitivity test. Results reveal that the signs and coefficients of 
the main analysis are similar to those of sensitivity checks. Thus, it 
is established that our findings for the main model are insensitive to 
alternative measurement for the independent variables.
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Table 6
Pool Results of the Alternative Measures of Independent Variable
VARIABLES Hypotheses and Expected Signs Coef. and t-values
ACSIZ H1(+) -0.597**
(0.303)
ACIDP H2 (+) 1.940
(1.189)
ACMET H3 (+) -0.350
(0.343)
ACFAEX H4 (+) 1.175***
(0.336)
ACLEX H5 (+) 0.346
(0.243)
FACME H6 (+) 2.075*
(1.165)
ACSOW H7 (+) -0.723***
(0.226)
ACTNR H8 (+) -0.638*
(0.367)


















Notes: AUBRN = Big 4 auditors (KPMG, Price Waterhouse Coopers, Ernst & Young 
and Deloitte). ACSIZ = AC size, ACIDP = AC independence, ACMET = AC meetings, 
ACFAEX = AC financial expertise, ACLEX = AC legal expert, FACME = female AC 
member, ACSOW = AC stock ownership, ACTNR = AC tenure, ACCHR = AC chair 
independence, BID = board independence, BFEX = board expertise, FSIZ = firm size 
LEVR = leverage, FAGE = firm age, SGROWTH = sales growth, Robust standard errors 
in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Alternative Estimation Using Lagged Values of the Predictor 
Variables
This section presents alternative estimation for the model using lagged 
values of the predictor variables. This is because endogeneity is a 
common problem associated to accounting research; it arises because 
of simultaneous consequences, explanatory variables and omitted 
variables (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010). It is contended that the link 
between the internal governance instruments and external auditing 
could be endogenous, where the strength of internal governance 
devices might lead to fewer or a prominent need for extensive 
external auditing; on the contrary, higher quality audits might lead 
to falling (or rising) other forms of internal governance devices (Hay, 
Knechel, & Ling, 2008). However, this study re-estimated the main 
model using the lagged values of the predictor variables to control 
this endogeneity problem or reverse causality problem (AlQadasi 
& Abidin, 2018; Alves, 2014). Table 7 shows the results of the re-
estimated model using the lagged values of the predictor variables. 
Overall, the signs and the coefficients of the main model are similar to 
those of the sensitivity checks. Thus, it is established that our findings 
are insensitive to endogeneity problem.
Table 7
Pool Results of the Alternative Estimation for the Model using Lagged 
Values of the Predictor Variables
(1)




ACIDP H2 (+) 2.605**
(1.134)
ACMET H3 (+) -0.392*
(0.206)
ACFAEX H4 (+) 3.081***
(0.834)
ACLEX H5 (+) 0.926
(1.216)
FACME H6 (+) 0.788***
(0.232)
ACSOW H7 (+) 3.35e-09**
(1.50e-09)
(continued)
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(1)
VARIABLES Lagged Values Independent 
variables
ACTNR H8 (+) -0.179**
(0.0747)


















Notes: AUBRN = Big 4 auditors (KPMG, Price Waterhouse Coopers, Ernst & Young 
and Deloitte). ACSIZ = AC size, ACIDP = AC independence, ACMET = AC meetings, 
ACFAEX = AC financial expertise, ACLEX = AC legal expert, FACME = female AC 
member, ACSOW = AC stock ownership, ACTNR = AC tenure, ACCHR = AC chair 
independence, BID = board independence, BFEX = board expertise, FSIZ = firm size 
LEVR = leverage, FAGE = firm age, SGROWTH = sales growth, Robust standard errors 
in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Conclusion
This paper examined the effect of audit committee attributes on auditor 
brand name. The results revealed that audit committee attributes 
enhances audit quality by increasing the likelihood of engaging Big 4 
auditors for greater audit assurance. Consistent with complementary 
hypothesis, the findings show that audit committee attributes are 
positively related to Big 4 auditors. The findings also support the 
substitutional hypothesis perspectives by revealing an inverse 
relationship between audit committee meeting, audit committee 
tenure, audit committee chair and Big 4 auditors. Our inferences are in 
line with both the agency theory and institutional theory. The findings 
are conclusive for these audit committee attributes that have been 
examined only to a limited extent in prior literature regarding their 
association with Big 4 auditors. Our findings offer an initial insight on 
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the effect of audit committee legal expert and audit committee stock 
ownership on Big 4 auditors. Thus, the findings inform of the existing 
and prospective shareholders who are the direct users of financial 
reports. This study can also help policy-makers and regulators by 
enabling them to better recognize the importance of these distinctive 
audit committee attributes in enhancing audits quality, which is one 
of the most vital elements in improving financial reporting quality. 
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